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America watched as Richard Nixon turned and waved a last goodbye from
the plane that would take him and his family to their home in San Clemente-and, hopefully, to a more peaceful existence than the one he was leaving
behind.
On August 8, 1974, Richard Milhous Hixon became the first President of
the United States to resign his office, after coming very close to being
the second President to be inpeached.

The Watergate scandal had already

sent nine former Nixon campaign official and White House aides to prison.
with five more preparing to stand trial in the fall.

The House had already

passed a resolution recommending an impeachment vote; all that was left was
the vote itself.

In an effort to preserve the dignity of the office, Nixon

felt it would be better if he, instead, removed himself before Congress
voted to remove him.

His successor: Gerald Ford, House

~~jority

Leader

from 1965 until his nomination as vice-president in late 1973. '
The media echoed the anticipation of the nation.

Now that Nixon was

no longer President, no longer in a position to use Executive Privilege as
a block to the investigation, would he be indicted?

And, should he be

indicted and convicted, would President Ford pardon him?
Ford's position had seemed clear.

During the Confirmation hearings

following his nomination as Vice-President, replacing Spiro Agnew, he was
asked, in the event that Nixon resigned his position, would Ford pardon
him.

"I do not think the public would stand for it.""
Then the situation changed, in the twisting-turning way that Watergate

had been unfolding for almost two years.
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On August 1, Alexander Haig,

former White House Chief-of-Staff, approached the Vice-President with a bit

of disturbing news: the Presidential tape of June 23, 1972, by decision of
the Supreme Court, was to be admitted as evidence against pome of Nixon's
former aides.

This tape, Haig informed Ford, established beyond a doubt

that Nixon had attempted to stop the investigation into Vatergate.
The news "stunned" Ford, as he had been steadfastly proclaiming his
boss's innocence.

He continued to do so during a tour of the south,

feeling a change of heart revealed at that critical time would make him
appear to have encouraged Nixon to resign in order to avoid impeachment.
In late August, he redefined his position.
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Now, he said in a news

conference on the 28th of the month, he was leaning toward granting the
former President a pardon, but since formal charges had not yet been
brought, such a move at that time would have been "unwise and untimely. ""
Yet, on August 30, he set Presidential consel Philip Buchen to work: did
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution give the President power to
pardon a man for crimes he had not been formally charged with committing.
Buchen brought in Benton Becker, a Vashington attorney, to do the job.
"Vorking over Labor Day weekend, Becker probed the precedents and concluded
that Ford could indeed pardon Nixon before indictment and trial."

Buchen

and Becker were already trying to hammer out a deal with Nixon's attorney,
Herbert J. Miller, Jr., by which Nixon could regain control and possession
of the Vhite House tapes and documents.

On September 5, they informed

Miller of Ford's intent to pardon his client. 6
Becker, accompanied by Miller, flew to San Clemente to finalize the
agreement on the White House tapes and documents, authorized by the Vhite
House not to promise a pardon, but, according to sources quoted in a
Newsweek report, "to say that in all probability, a pardon would be
forthcoming."

However, even with encouragement by his attorney, NilCon was

reluctant to accept this offer, by accounts, due to depression. a "slipping

away from reali ty. '"

More likely, it was due to the fact .that the pardon

came with a catch; Buchen, Becker, and Ford wanted Nixon to make a public
statement of acceptance, in which he conceded that he had, in fact, broken
the law. e

Nixon finally agreed.

Ford addressed the nation on the sleepy Sunday morning of September 8,
one month after Nixon resigned, and woke it up.

He announced that he

granted "a full, free and absolute pardon to Richard Nixon for all offenses
against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may
have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969,
through August 9, 1974. "',"
Nixon's acceptance followed, though it was not quite the statement of
contrition that Buchen, Becker and the President had hoped for:" ... one
thing I can see clearly now is that I was wrong in not acting more
decisively in dealing with Watergate, particularly when it reached the
stage of judicial proceedings and grew from a political scandal into a
national tragedy .... That the way I tried to deal with Watergate was the
wrong way is a burden I shall bear for every day of ife that is left to
me.
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If Ford's overall judgment was soon to be called into question, he was
clearly right on two counts: it was unwise and untimely, and the country
didn't stand for it.

But soon the Congress, the Courts, the press and the

American people came to realize that there was nothing they could do about
it.

The power to grant pardons is summed up in its Constitutional entirety
in Article II, Section 2, which states that the President "shall have the
Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United

States, except in cases Impeachment."

The Congress has established

gUidelines by which pardons are to be applied, recommended by the Attorney
General, and sent to the President for his approval.

But these are merely

suggestions; the pardoning power is broad enough to allow disregard of
those suggestions when the President feels it is expedient.
The pardon was seen as atypical, as pardons are normally reserved
until after criminal proceedings are complete.
precedent.

It was not, however without

In 1867, President Andrew Jackson granted a full pardon to A.

H. Garland, a former Congressman in the Confederacy, who, after the war,
was barred from public service.

The pardon, extending to acts against the

United States for which Garland was never officially charge but that he
might have committed, was challenge by the basis that the pardoning power
was limited to offenses recognized by law.

The court upheld the pardon

however, stating in part that the power to pardon "extends to every offense
known to the law and may be exercised at any time after its commission,
either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendancy, or
after conviction and judgment.""
Another case, Biddle v. Perovich, supports Ford's act.

Until this

1927 case, a pardon was viewed as a "private act of grace," from which only
the recipient served to benefit.

Biddle redefined the purpose of a pardon,

that new purpose being service of a benefit to the public at large.
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" ... Theirs [Richard Nixon and his family] is an American tragedy in
which we have all played a part. It can go on and on and on, or someone
must write 'The End' to it.
if I can, I must.

I have concluded

~hat

only I can do that.

As President, my primary concern must always be the

greatest good of all the people of the United States, whose servant I
am."'"

Richard Nixon's health, both mental and physical, was on the

And

decline.

It could take months, even years, for the publicity to die down

enough for Nixon to receive a fair trial.

The delay and the inevitable

trial would divide the country's sentiments, and disrupt the peace Nixon
tried to give to both himself and the nation by his August 8 resignation.
Finally, Ford said" I feel that Richard Nixon and his loved ones have
suffered enough and will continue to suffer ... " 14
For many people, these simply were not reasons strong enough to shield
Nixon and to place him above the law once again.

Those in prison for their

complicity, their families, and those connected with the prosecution were
particularly fired up.

"Mr. Nixon and his family are not the only ones who

suffered enough," said Maureen Dean, wife of former consel to the
President, John Dean, who was in prison.

There were other parties involved

with Watergate that were "suffering because they told the truth, which is
something we have yet to hear from Mr. Nixon."'';
Federal Judge John Sirica, looking back on Watergate in 1979, resented
the pardon not only because it could have been better for the country had
the issue been decide by the courts, but because Nixon managed to escape a
scandal largely of his own making, leaving others to suffer the
consequneces.

"His associates served time in jail.

He received a large

government pension, and retired to his lovely home in San Clemente.

I

still wonder whether the concept of equal justice under the law really
applies if one climbs high enough in terms of wealth, power, and
influence .... it still bothers me that Richard Nixon escaped that equal
treatment.

I feel that if he hd been

convicte~

in my court, I would have

sent him to jail.'lls

Those yet to stand trial, and thse already serving time were wondering
when they would get their breaks.

Requests for pardons soon began to

arrive from the 39 already convicted in connection with Watergate.

Those

nine yet to stand trial expected dismissal of their cases,. or, at the very
least, pardons after conviction.

Attorneys for H. R. Haldeman, John

Ehrlichman, and others asked for a delay of the start of the trials slated
to begin October 1.

They felt that the publicity caused by the pardon and

Nixon's acceptance would prejudice jurors into presuming their guilt before
they were even tried.

Judge Sirica had been dealing with Watergate for

many months, and he was beginning to tire of it all; he postponed the trial
for one day to assemble a new pool of jurors.
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The next question was whether the others involved were to receive
pardons as well.

On September 10, Ford authorized press secretary John

Hushen to report that a blanket pardon was under study.

The uproar

surrounding the singular pardon of Nixon intensified. The Senate passed a
resolution urging that the President issue no further pardons until after
the defendants stood trial.
mouth.

Members of both parties were frothing at the

Hurriedly, the White House amended their statement to say that

pardons for all other Watergate offenders would have to proceed through the
regular channels, and would be considered on a case hy case basis.

'8

The concept of equality under the law was being met with greater and
greater cynicism.

The former President received a full and free pardon

through little effort of his own, only a month after he resigned.

The

"regular channels" through which all the rest would have to pass did not
even become available to them until after conviction and a three year
"grace period" during which they have to serve their sentences in prison.
Said a Washington D.C, lawyer and clemency scholar, "The American public
will read this as just one more chapter in the old story of the
Establ ishment taking care of its own. "2"

Ie·

Those yet to

f~ce

the music were concerned for their own

Nixon pardon, they assumed, would make it even more

diffic~lt

welf~re,

The

for them to

receive fair trials. In Judge Sirica's court, however, the bias of the
jurors was in favor of those the Nixon pardon left out in the cold.
" ... Many of the prospective jurors had indicated that they felt the Nixon
pardon made it unfair to try the former President's aides.
that i f the top man went free, so should those around him.

They reasoned
""2\

There were doubts by the prosecution that further trials would even
take place.

After the September 10 discussion of a potential blanket

pardon for those remaining, according to a source quoted by Newsweek,
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski called a top White House official and
demanded to know if any more pardons were goi ng to be issued. 'Z',

There was

speculation. according to further sources, concerning the usefulness of
proceeding with the trials.

"The only thing that can save it is for Leon

to convince us all that it is still worthwhile to continue--that, somehow,
justice still will be done.

I don't see now how he can do it.

""24

A larger concern, both to those involved with the trials yet to come
and the American public at large, was if Nixon could still be called to
testify.

The pardoning power is relatively Obscure, and not fully

understood by the pUblic.

U,S News and World Report, accompanying an

article descibing the pardon itself, gave a synopis of the questions being
asked by "recognized authorities" that not only satisfactorily answered the
concerns of those conducting the trial but those on trial as well.

In

short:
First: the pardon only shielded Nixon from offenses committed against
the United States from January 20, 1969, to August 9, 1974, as stated in
the pardon.

Second: Nixon could still be tried for offenses against the States,
and was still subject to civil litigation.
Third: Nixon could still be called upon to offer testimony.

The Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination was not really a protective
shield for him anymore, as the pardon protects him from indictment for his
complicity in the Watergate affair.

He can still be cited for contempt of

court, and can still go to jail should he perjure himself. 26
What about the tapes?

Part of the agreement leading to the pardon

dealt with Nixon regaining control of the White House tapes and documents
connected with the Watergate affair.

Under the agreement, both the tapes

and the documents would become the personal posessions of Nixon, the
traditional practice followed with previous presidents.

They would still

be subject to subpeona by the federal courts for a period of three years in
regard to the documents and five years for the tapes. After such time Nixon
would be allowed to do with of them as he saw fit--most likely,
destruction.

If, after five years Nixon decided not to destroy the tapes,

they were to be destroyed after ten years or at the time of Nixon's death,
whichever came first.
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The agreement was suspended by the White House

when Jaworski requested to use some of the tapes, and Nixon went to court
to try to have the original agreement enforced.

The White House, however,

decided to stand firm in their resolution, at least until such time as an
agreement was made that satisfied the needs of the special prosector. 27
Americans, the press, and those involved in the investigation and
prosecution of the case were disappointed that

~hey

would never have the

opportunity to truly know the facts about Nixon's involvement in the breakin at the Watergate apartments and office complex or in the cover-up that
followed.

Even President Ford had to be a bit dismayed at Nixon's lack of

contrition expressed in his dcceptdnce of the pdrdon.

Ford fdced the

questions to which the nation had been wanting answers at a news conference
September 16, and his answers were vague, round-about, and disappointing to
a country that needed desperately to find a reason to believe in him again:
'''Throughout your Vice-Presidency, you said that you didn't believe
that former President Nixon had ever committed an impeachable offense.

Is

that still your bel ien"
"The fact that 38 members of the House Committee on the Judiciary-Democrat and Republican--have unanimously agreed in the report that was
filed that the former President was gUilty of an impeachable offense I
think is very persuasive evidence."
"Do you believe his acceptance of a pardon implied his guilt, or is an
admission of guilt?"
"The acceptance of a pardon, I think can be construed by many, i f not
all, as an admission of guilt.

IIZ

E\

The President seemed embittered by the results of his actiDn, whether
due to the negativity of public opinion, much greater than he had
expected,~~

Dr by the thanklessness of his SUbject.

Nixon was causing

problems over the agreement reached cDncerning the tapes.

In addition,

Nixon, in a phone conversation with a former associate, had the nerve to
criticize Ford's performance on the job; ironically, his main gripe was
with Ford's plan to offer amnesty to Vietnam draft resisters. so
The question ineVitably becomes, which was the lesser of two evils
(for, ultimately, that was the decision facing President FDrd); the
continuation of unrest and divisive opiniDn in a nation that had for tDO
long been at Ddds with itself, or the disregard for the truth, so that
future generations might well be doomed to repeat the failures Df the ones

before?

Watergate is a term heard often enough by the younger generations

that will soon be in power, but with little or no factual knowledge about
what happenned, or why.

Stereotypes in television, comedy, the media at

large, even education tell those who were not there to see for themelves
that Richard Nixon was a "crook," but none can say for sure, because those
who were there never had the opportunity to find out for themselves.
History repeats itself, and the mistkes of the past should be
remembered and place us on guard.

Raoul Berger, Harvard law professor,

aptly sums it up: "[Nixon] rose from the ashes in
stop him naw?" 3

1

'62.~

Well, what's to
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